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POLEMIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Jurisprudence, used as a technical term, has two meanings of
equal currency, referring both to a philosophy of law and a science
which "treats of the principles of positive law and legal relations." 1
These meanings are vastly different in import. "Philosophy" suggests speculation and ideology, while "science" suggests fact and
functionalism. Jurisprudence, like any discipline of observation
and conclusion, can be a very useful tool in the legal analysis of
one's own work and the work of others. The science, with its
clear sight and objective standards, is obviously more dependable
than the polemics of philosophy, and therefore the sole approach
to be used in situations that demand objectivity. If any area of
jurisprudence demands this objectivity, it is the area of judicial
decision. It is the premise of this Comment that much of what is
written about legal judgments, and often the judgments themselves, contain so much polemic that they sometimes produce
results contrary to a primary function of legal systems, the settlement of disputes. This is an especially critical problem in the international sphere, where the tendency to mix fact and polemic often
detracts from the legal justifications of a particular dispute's resolution.
The most recent decision of the International Court of Justice,
the 1974 Icelandic Fisheries Cases 2-the actions of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany against Iceland for the
unilateral extension of Icelandic coastal fisheries jurisdiction3-will
be used to illustrate the confusion of fact with polemic. That Court
divided, not over the finding for Applicants, but over the techniques
that should have been used to reach that finding. There were several
lesser issues of fact and law, but the major controversy was one of
approach. While most jurisprudential questions can be stated in
terms of objective criteria, debate can often degenerate to philo1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
2. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of.Great Britain and Northern Ireland
v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175. An edited copy of the Judgments may be found in 13 lNT'L LEGAL
MAT'Ls 1049-114 (1974).
3. For the background of the dispute see Evans, Judicial Decisions, Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice under compromissory clause in exchange of notes, 67 AM. J.
INT'L L. 547, 563 (1973); Tiewul, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (1973) and the Ghost of
Rebus Sic Stantibus, 6 N.Y.U.J. lNT'L L. & PoL. 455 (1973); 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 512
(1973).
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sophical argumentation, i.e. position statements. Polemic questions
of what might be called judicial style should be left in chambers
and not written into the decisions of a world court. The intention
of this Comment is not to malign jurisprudence, but to attempt to
serve as a gadfly with the hope of provoking a more rigorous use of
this important discipline. The presentation will consist of a brief
historical background of western jurisprudence, followed by an analysis of the major points of contention in the Icelandic Fisheries
decisions, closing with some speculation as to the causes and consequences of the use of polemic in and by a world court. 4

II.

HISTORY

Although jurisprudence has long been the most abstruse and
complex of the social disciplines-a sort of practical man's metaphysics-areas of general agreement, or schools, have been demarked by jurisprudents. Traditionally, there have been four basic
divisions (although countless subdivisions are possible): naturallaw, historical, formalist or analytic and realist schools. 5
The natural-law or philosophical school has been the most longlived and influential historically, although it seems to have fewer
adherents today. From Aristotle to the present, the search for a
complete system of legal and ethical concepts that mirror man's
assumedly rational nature 8 has been a Holy Grail that has tempted
many. However, absolute justice in the abstract has often proven
such a pliable concept that vastly different positions have found
shelter under its umbrella. Both democracy and dictatorship have
been justified in its name with equal conviction. 7
The historical school, originally a German conceptualization of
the Volksgeist, or spirit of the people, was in conscious opposition
to natural law. 8 Both anti-rational and anti-abstractionist, the
4. In response to the possible charge that this condemnation of polemic is itself very
argumentative, the reply can only be that all attempts to insure dispassionate analysis have
been made, and that student comments are not judicial decrees; they cannot coerce compliance.
5. J. RoSENBERG, JEROME FRANK: JURIST AND PHILOSOPHER 1 (1970).
6. Id. at 1-2.
7. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 348 (1950) .
8. An extensive outline of the historical school, its roots and branches, can be found in
a three-part article by Dean Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 50 HARV. L . REV.
557 (1937), 51 HARV. L. REV. 444, 777 (1938). This article also touches upon the other schools
of jurisprudence, including realism . However, considering the debate between Pound and the
proponents of realism (see notes 22 & 23 infra), the section might be read with some scepticism.
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school modeled itself not after man's natural reason but after his
social institutions. Although it was the dominant school of the nineteenth century, the historical school is now of more interest to historians than to legal scholars. 9
Both the natural-law and historical schools were dedicated to
drafting the ideal body of laws, independent of experience. In the
early twentieth century, however, there arose a new body of
jurisprudence, oriented toward analyzing the law not as it ought
to be but as it is. 10 Of course, as there had been no agreement as
to what the law ought to be, neither has there been agreement as
to what it is. Under the influence of John Austin, law and morality
were severed and logic became the life of the law. This formalistic
view of law dominated Anglo-American thought for 50 years, 11
until it was challenged by a spawn of the infant social sciences,
legal realism. Youngest of the jurisprudential schools, legal realism holds that "the life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience." 12
The division of jurisprudence into various schools is most helpful in the study of law for it necessitates approaching the subject
from different points of view. Historically, however, these schools
have been seen by many jurisprudents as competitors, each striving
for victory over the others. In contrast to the constructive objectivity of the scientific approach, this competition has been primarily
destructive. The attempt of each school to discredit all others has
tended to undermine respect for law in general.
At present, formalism and realism comprise the most active
jurisprudential schools; 13 the dialogue between them will serve as
the focus of this article. The formalistic viewpoint is rooted in John
Austin's analytical positivism, 14 which separated ethical, social and
political questions from the study of law. 15 The main function of
9. J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 2.
10. Id. at 2.
11. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 3 (1950).
12. o.w. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
13. A revival of natural law was heralded by some in the late 1950's, bringing ethics back
into what they felt, in realism, was an overly scientific approach. Jiall, The Present Position
of Jurisprudence in the United States, 44 VA. L. REV. 321, 323 (1958). This seems a very
narrow view of the realistic approach-which attempts to incorporate all social disciplines,
including ethics, into a coherent whole. The inclusion of ethical considerations in jurisprudence is not necessarily a return to natural law (at the expense of legal realism) as realism
utilizes the abstract approach for analysis only.
14. J. STONE, supra note 11, at 55.
15. Bodenheimer, Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal
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jurisprudence, according to Austin, was the abstraction of principles, notions and distinctions which were common to developed
systems of law .16 Although its principles of analysis were derived in
part from the concepts of Hobbes and Bentham, 17 its method remained strictly logical, describing an internally consistent closed
system which is enacted or "posited" by a political authority. With
the exception of the United States, the birthplace of realism, analytical formalism is still the dominant jurisprudential school in England and the former British Empire. 18 In the United States, formalistic analysis was initially embraced by many distinguished legal
scholars, including Dean Langdell and Professor Beale of Harvard. 19
Speaking for realism was their contemporary, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., who characterized a workable legal system based totally on logic as a myth. He declared that "the logical method and
form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in
every human mind." 20 The controversy between adherents of the
two schools simmered within the American legal establishment for
a quarter of a century before boiling into direct confrontation. 21 In
1931 Dean Pound published a criticism of realism as he saw it, 22 to
which Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank responded in the best apologist tradition, alleging misrepresentation and misunderstanding. 23
Pound's attack allowed realism to state its case. Since then realism
has been seen by most as coming to the fore in the United States.
It has recently been said, "realism is dead, we all are realists now, " 24
and that, in fact, America is in a post-realist period. 25 It is true that
Method, 44 VA. L. REV. 365, 367-69 (1958).
16. Id. at 368.
17. Pound, supra note 8, 50 HARV. L. REV. at 582.
18. E. PATIERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND loEAS OF THE LAW 84 (1953).
19. J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 3.
20. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 465 (1897) . Holmes "helped
undermine the conception that law can be worked out, like pure geometry, from axioms and
corollaries." J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 21.
21. It was a most confusing confrontation. The confusion was largely created by the
technique of laying out an opponent's position in one's own terms, then quickly destroying
the strawman. Compounding the distortion was the unhappy fact that self-definition was
often speculative and hasty. w. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 74
379-80 (1973).
,
22. Pound, The Call fora Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). Pound was
not a true formalist, but the founder of "sociological jurisprudence," which rejected realism
as too radical. J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 7, 10.
23. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222 (1931).
24. W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 382.
25. Hall, supra note 13, at 325.
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today there are few jurisprudents who would call themselves realists. But this was true even in the 1930's. The power of realism· lies
in its approach, not in adherence to an historically established set
of tenets. 26 Although Llewellyn and Frank are no longer alive, their
interdisciplinary outlook and sceptical rigor generated what is still
one of the most productive jurisprudential approaches.
While the United States and Britain are solidly under the influence of realistic and formalistic approaches respectively, the debate
remains active in the rest of the world community and within the
International Court of Justice. 27 In so recent a decision as the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 28 analysts of the Court were able to
find support for both formalist and realist positions. 29 The realist
position, however, now seems to be gaining support in the I.C.J. As
in the United States, this evolution has been laid to the advent of
the social sciences:
[T]he Judges now being elected, and likely to be in the future,
come from a generation of legal scholars which recognizes the significance of functional and sociological approaches, and as such are
determined to bring the Court and the law they are called upon to
30
apply up-to-date and suitable for the mid-century world .

III.
A.

THE JUDGMENT

Approach

Neither realism nor formalism is guilty of the excesses that the
other ascribes to it; realism is not rabidly illogical, nor is formalism
the ivory tower of reaction. In fact, there is evidence to show that
these positions are closer together than they have ever been. 31
However, a series of generalizations about both sides32 will be
26. W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 382.
27. The I.C.J. is here taken as a representative of the world legal community. Gross, The
International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the
International Legal Order, 65 AM . J. INT'L L. 253, 325-26 (1971).
28. [1969J l.C.J. 3.
29. Gross, supra note 27, at 268.
30. Green, The United Nations, South West Africa and the World Court, 7 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 491, 522 (1967), quoted in Gross, supra note 27, at 267-68.
31. Bodenheimer, supra note 15, at 365.
32. Realism propounds: (1) law in flux and judicial creation of law; (2) law as a means
to social ends and not as an end in itself, i.e. judging law by both purpose and effect;
(3) society in flux, usually at a faster rate than law, implying the constant need for reexamination; (4) the temporary divorce of "Is" and "Ought" for study purposes, i.e. the
scientific approach; (5) distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts as able descriptions of
what courts or people actually do; and (6) distrust of traditional rules of judicial decision-
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provisionally accepted by this Comment as the basic assumptions
of its analysis, until conclusions can be reached by empirical means.
Without empirical foundation, the most impeccably reasoned argument of student or Judge may be without referent, and thus without
persuasive force.
B.

Analysis

It is a premise of this Comment that the majority and dissent
in the Icelandic Fisheries Cases follow the outlines of realism and
formalism, respectively. 33 There are five major points of conflict
within the decision. That is to say, there are five issues over which
the majority and dissent clash. 34 They are, in order of treatment: (1)
making (paper rules), i.e. subjection of these rules to critical scrutiny. Llewellyn, supra note
23, at 1236-37. This seems to be a fairly rigorous, though artificial, listing of common positions, taken from the realists of Llewellyn's day. Few of them viewed themselves as belonging
to any school and several were offended at inclusion, but Llewellyn has not seriously misrepresented anyone, noting, in fact, this anti-group attitude. Less rigorous is a list of the views of
the formalists who view the law, according to a leading American proponent, Professor J.
Beale, as "UNIFORM, GENERAL, CONTINUOUS, EQUAL, CERTAIN, PURE." J.
ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 17. No champion of formalism could be found to attempt a
detailed self-definition, perhaps because of this (attributed) preference for general over specific analysis. Militant generality can be seen in the dissenting opinion of Judge IgnacioPinto:
Perhaps some might even say that the classic conception of international law to
which I declare allegiance is out-dated; but for myself, I do not fear to continue to
respect the classic norms of that law.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 175, 210.
Judge Ignacio-Pinto, however, is not too specific about the nature of these norms.
33. The concurring and dissenting opinions will be treated as united fronts, except where
otherwise noted. Likewise, the United Kingdom and Federal Republic decisions will be
treated as fundamentally similar, except on the issue of compensation and where otherwise
noted.
34. All of these issues concern the Judgments or their effects. The United Kingdom
Judgment runs as follows:
THE COURT,

by ten votes to four,
(1) finds that the Regulations concerning the Fishery Limits off Iceland promulgated
by the Government oflceland on 14July1972 and constituting a unilateral extension
of the exclusive fishing rights of Iceland to 50 nautical miles from the baselines
specified therein are not opposable to the Government of the United Kingdom;
(2) finds that, in consequence, the Government of Iceland is not entitled unilaterally
to exclude United Kingdom fishing vessels from areas between the fishery limits
agreed to in the Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961 and the limits specified in the
Icelandic Regulations of 14 July 1972, or unilaterally to impose restrictions on the
activities of those vessels in such areas;
by ten votes to four,
(3) holds that the Government of Iceland and the Government of the United Kingdom are under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the
equitable solution of their differences concerning their respective fishery rights in the
areas specified in subparagraph 2;
(4) holds that in these negotiations the Parties are to take into account, inter alia:
(a) that in the distribution of the fishing resources in the areas specified in
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the legality of Iceland's extension of control of coastal fishing areas
under international law; (2) the relevance of questions of preferential treatment and fisheries conservation; (3) the Court's imposition
of a duty to negotiate upon the parties; (4) the Applicant's claim
for damages caused by Iceland's assertion of the fisheries extension;
and (5) the effect of this decision on the contemporaneous Law of
the Sea Conference. By issue, the dissent and majority strong points
will be analyzed, indicating which seems most persuasive; that is
to say, which relies less on polemic over fact-which is less polarizing.
1.

LEGALITY OF THE EXTENSION

The first point to be considered is one of the most central-the
duty of the I.C.J. to decide that the fifty-mile extension of jurisdiction over fisheries from baselines around the coast of Iceland is
subparagraph 2 Iceland is entitled to a preferential share to the extent of the
special dependence of its people upon the fisheries in the seas around its
coasts for their livelihood and economic development;
(b) that by reason of its fishing activities in the areas specified in subparagraph 2, the United Kingdom also has established rights in the fishery resources of the said areas on which elements of its people depend for their
livelihood and economic well-being;
(c) the obligation to pay due regard to the interests of other States in the
conservation and equitable exploitation of these resources;
(d) that the above-mentioned rights of Iceland and of the United Kingdom
should each be given effect to the extent compatible with the conservation
and development of the fishery resources in the areas specified in subparagraph 2 and with the interests of other States in their conservation and
equitable exploitation;
(e) their obligation to keep under review those resources and to examine
together, in light of scientific and other available information, such measures
as may be required for the conservation and development, and equitable
exploitation, of those resources, making use of the machinery established by
the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention or such other means as may
be agreed upon as a result of international negotiations.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 34. The Federal Republic Judgment has one additional paragraph:
by ten votes to four,
(5) finds that it is unable to accede to the fourth submission of the Federal Republic
of Germany.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 206.
The fourth submission concerned a request for compensation for interference with the operations of German fishing vessels by Icelandic patrol boats.
Present and participating in the proceedings were: President Lachs; Judges (Majority)
Forster, Bengzon, Dillard, de Castro, Morozov, Jim~nez de Arechaga, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Nagendra Singh, Ruda; (Dissent) Gros, Petren, Onyeama, Ignacio-Pinto; and Registrar
Aquarone. All judges except Morozov wrote separate opinions.
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"without foundation in international law and is invalid." 35 The argument put forth by the dissent is that the issue, as defined by the
parties, 36 is binding upon the Court. The Court should serve, so this
argument goes, as a sort of Delphic Oracle, only answering questions
that are put to it. If it fails to answer these questions, which comprise the matter at issue, the Court is not fulfilling its proper function.37 This appears to be a classic formalist position, a conviction
35. Subparagraph (a) of the conclusion of the United Kingdom Memorial and subparagraph 1 of the conclusion of the Federal Republic Memorial. The United Kingdom Memorial
on the merits was concluded as follows:
. . . the Government of the United Kingdom submit to the Court that the Court
should adjudge and declare:
(a) that the claim by Iceland to be entitled to a zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction
extending 50 nautical miles from baselines around the coast of Iceland is without
foundation in international law and is invalid;
( b) that, as against the United Kingdom, Iceland is not entitled unilaterally to assert
an exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond the limits agreed to in the Exchange of
Notes of 1961;
(c) that Iceland is not entitled unilaterally to exclude British fishing vessels from the
area of the high seas beyond the limits agreed to in the Exchange of Notes of 1961 or
unilaterally to impose restrictions on the activities of such vessels in that area;
(d) that activities by the Government of Iceland such as are referred to in Part V of
this Memorial, that is to say, interference by force or the threat of force with British
fishing vessels operating in the said area of the high seas, are unlawful and that
Iceland is under an obligation to make compensation therefore to the United Kingdom (the form and amount of such compensation to be assessed, failing agreement
between the Parties, in such manner as the Court may indicate); and
(e) that, to the extent that a need is asserted on conservation grounds, supported by
properly attested scientific evidence, for the introduction of restrictions on fishing
activities in the said area of the high seas, Iceland and the United Kingdom are under
a duty to examine together in good faith (either bilaterally or together with other
interested States and either by new arrangements or through already existing machinery for international collaboration in these matters such as the North-East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission) the existence and extent of that need and similarly to negotiate for the establishment of such a regime for the fisheries of the area as, having due
regard to the interests of other States, will ensure for Iceland, in respect of any such
restrictions that are shown to be needed as aforesaid, a preferential position consistent with its position as a State specially dependent on those fisheries and as will
also ensure for the United Kingdom a position consistent with its traditional interest
and acquired rights in and current dependency on these fisheries.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 7.
The Federal Republic Memorial's conclusion is essentially similar, except for numbering
versus lettering of the paragraphs. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany
v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 179.
36. The United Kingdom and the Federal Republic had all the input, as Iceland did not
participate. "Iceland has not taken part in any phase of the present proceedings." Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland),
[1974] l.C.J. 3, 8.
37. [I]t is particularly necessary to satisfy oneself that the Court is passing
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that the legal frame of question-and-answer not only meets the
needs of the parties, but is in fact the only viable method of
decision-making, and that the findings of the Court are dictated by
the expectations of the parties.
The majority held, in contrast, that the Court is in fact master
of its own jurisdiction and not controlled by the parties, 38 in line
with Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. The formalist position
is certainly guaranteed to satisfy at least one side; but it allows the
Court no room to exercise judicial notice of any matter not specifically brought to its attention. The majority, when concluding that
the state of international law did not yield a definitive statement
on the fifty-mile limit, noted that a solidification of the law in a time
of social flux would do the parties more harm than good, 39 by forcing
them to a stasis while the other countries remained flexible. This is
the orthodox realist position, that justice in any judicial decision
can only be obtained by considering all the elements of the situation, including the consequences of the decision. The majority finds
support in the Statute of the I.C.J ., Article 53, which allows the
Court to consider all relevant rules of international law. Article 53
sets a tone of judicial inquiry outside of the boundaries of the Applicant's pleadings. This authorization, coupled with the United Kingdom's reply to the Court that its request to declare the extension
against international law per se could be severed from its Memorial
without injustice, presents the more plausible rationale of the
two. The Federal Republic was not as congenial as the United
Kingdom, and did not agree to any such severance.
2.

CONSERVATION AND PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS

The second point of conflict, which overlaps the first, concerns
subparagraph (4) of the Judgment, which deals with the finding of
upon a dispute which has been defined as justiciable by Iceland and the United
Kingdom, and not some other dispute constructed during consideration of the case
by the Court.
Id. at 126 (Gros, J., dissenting).
38. "[Tjhe Court, as a master of its own jurisdiction, is not controlled by the position
taken by the Applicants, but is compelled to inquire into the scope of its own jurisdiction
. . . ."Id. at 63 (Dillard, J., concurring).
39. "[Tjhe Judgment . . . does not preclude the Parties from benefiting from any
subsequent developments in the pertinent rules of international law." Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 216 (declaration of Nagendra Singh, J.).
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preferential rights and need for conservation. 40 The dissent argued
that the Court should not have avoided Applicants' primary pleading. Furthermore, it should not have considered the outside information on preferences and conservation, as the Applicants nowhere
sought a decision on these matters; and thus they were not at
issue. 41 This is a weak argument, considering subparagraph (e) of
the United Kingdom's and subparagraph (3) of the Federal Republic's Memorials, 42 which make these very assertions. The dissent's
stronger argument is that, regardless of the memorials of the parties,
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court arose from the 1961
Exchange of Notes, 43 and the boundaries defined by these notes do
not include these issues. 44
This argument does not center on Applicants' desires, but illustrates the basic formalist-realist dichotomy. The formalists usually
look at the structure of the decision, concerned with whether it
addresses the issues in a traditional manner and whether the procedural essentials are being observed. The realists see the decision's
consequences as more crucial, emphasizing ends as much as
means. 45 The end sought here is the settlement of this dispute and
40. See notes 34-35 supra.
41. It should be observed that the Applicant has nowhere sought a decision from
the Court on a dispute between itself and Iceland on the subject of the preferential
rights of the coastal State, the conservation of fish species, or historic rights . . . .
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 208
(declaration of Ignacio-Pinto, J.). "[I]t is my view that the Court settled an issue on which
the Parties were not in dispute." Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 164 (Onyeama, J., dissenting).
42. See note 35 supra.
43. "[l]t is the 1961 treaty which determines what the subject-matter of the justiciable
dispute is . . . . "Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 127 (Gros, J., dissenting).
44. The 1961 Exchange of Notes contained the following provision: " . . . in case of a
dispute relating to [an extension of the fishery jurisdiction of Iceland], the matter shall, at
the request of either Party, be referred to the International Court of Justice." In his dissenting
opinion, Judge Gros stated:
I cannot accept the argument that a form of words as precise as 'dispute in relation
to the extension of fisheries jurisdiction' can be interpreted as impliedly including
any connected question . . . if the other Party refused to make that question the
subject of the agreement itself. The 1961 agreement only contemplated one sort of
dispute as justiciable, namely the extension of Iceland's fisheries jurisdiction.
Id. at 127-28.
45. It [the Court] was not compelled to refer to preferential rights and conservation needs. This I take to be a question of judicial discretion and even prudence.
But all this does not entail the consequence that it is precluded from dealing with
the dispute on the broader grounds so earnestly sought by the Applicant. To read
the Exchange of Notes of 1961 otherwise, that is to say, in a too restrictive fashion,
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the bringing together of the parties. 46 As a matter of policy, if the
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic want to stipulate to the
preferential rights of Iceland, in an apparent attempt to negotiate,
then should the Court not aid them, if its function is the settlement
of disputes? The realist position here seems the more justifiable, as
long as the balance of ends and means is maintained.
As to the jurisdictional argument that these questions are ancillary, 47 the majority reasoning is based on both the history of the
dispute, 48 which indicates the parties were concerned with these
issues throughout negotiations, and in the 1961 Exchange of
Notes, 49 which is not a narrowly drafted document. Between the
two, dissent and majority, the latter's arguments are more persuasive; the dissent has previously stipulated that the Exchange of
Notes can be used to define jurisdiction, and the boundaries of a
"dispute in relation to the extension of fisheries jurisdiction around
Iceland" are broad enough to include all the issues of the controversy. Here the passion of logical positivists, as Austin's followers
came to be called, for defining their terms shows weakness when
used as a base in a formalist jurisprudential system. The positivist
tendency is to narrow all issues to their bare bones, believing impassionately in the maxim that simplicity means clarity and clarity
means accuracy. 50 The dissent has given the 1961 Exchange of Notes
may have sufficed to decide the immediate issue between the Parties but, in my view,
it would not have sufficiently sufficed to resolve the dispute by recognizing the
interests of both Parties and supplying guides for their future conduct . . . .
Id. at 66 (Dillard, J., concurring).
46. "[T]he settlement of a dispute . . . is the ultimate objective of all adjudication as
well as of the United Nations Charter and the Court . . . . "Id. at 42 (declaration of Nagendra Singh, J.).
47. "[A]ll the other points in the submissions are only ancillary or consequential to this
primary claim" that the extension has no basis in international law. Id. at 36 (declaration of
Ignacio-Pinto, J.).
48. In the light of the negotiations between the Parties . . . it seems evident that
the dispute between the Parties includes disagreements as to the extent and scope
of their respective rights in the fishery resources and the adequacy of measures to
conserve them. It must therefore be concluded that those disagreements are an element of the 'dispute in relation to the extension of fisheries jurisdiction around
Iceland.'
Id. at 21.
49. The weakness . . . in the argument which would deny the Court jurisdictional power to respond to this issue is rooted in a too simplistic concept of the nature
of the dispute . . . . [T]he dispute covered in the Exchange of Notes is not of [such
aj clearly delineated character.
Id. at 66 (Dillard, J., concurring).
50. For an introduction to the theories of recent logical positivists see A.J. AYER, LAN-
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the narrowest possible construction, and seems to have done so
incorrectly. 51
3.

DUTY TO NEGOTIATE

The next point of conflict is the duty to negotiate, 52 which the
dissent argues is futile and irrelevant. Their argument has several
parts. First, the 1973 Exchange of Notes 53 between the United Kingdom and Iceland has made the Court's order to negotiate moot in
that case and thus, the Court should not be making ineffective
gestures. 54 Second, any bilateral duty to negotiate in a situation
which is essentially multilateral is totally without effect, especially
in light of the Icelandic agreement with the European Economic
Community to negotiate fisheries rights with the European nations
as a group. 55 This second argument presents the dichotomy, often
espoused by the majority, of immediate resolution versus future
consequences, 56 but with a twist. This time the dissenting judges
GUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (2d ed. 1952); LOGICAL POSITIVISM (A.J. Ayer ed. 1959); LOGIC AND
LANGUAGE (A. Flew ed. 1951).
51. This is in sharp contrast to the distributive justice (as opposed to corrective or
remedial justice) advocated by Judge Dillard, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 3, 70, which appears to be
the broadest interpretation possible. Often the best course is avoidance of rigid construction
rules of any sort.
52. The question has been raised whether the Court has jurisdiction to pronounce upon certain matters referred to the Court in the last paragraph of the
Applicant's final submissions . . . to the effect that the parties are under a duty to
examine together the existence and extent of the need for restrictions of fishing
activities in Icelandic waters on conservation grounds and to negotiate for the establishment of such a regime as will, inter alia, ensure for Iceland a preferential position
consistent with its position as a State specially dependent on its fisheries.
Id. at 20.
53. The Exchange of Notes of 1973 included a catch limit, areas of permitted fishing,
and expiration date of 13November1975. No such agreement was negotiated with the Federal
Republic. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 3, 17; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 175, 188.
54. "The conclusion of the interim agreement has therefore had the effect of rendering
the Application of the United Kingdom without object so far as the period covered by the
agreement is concerned." Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J. 3, 157 (Petren, J., dissenting).
55. By finding, in the Judgment, that there is a bilateral obligation to negotiate
concerning 'respective' rights of a bilateral character, when Iceland has accepted a
multilateral obligation to negotiate on much wider bases in institutions and international bodies which do not come within the purview of the Court's jurisdiction, the
Court has formulated an obligation which is devoid of all useful application.
Id. at 141 (Gros, J., dissenting).
56. "The Court must take into account the situation which will result from the delivery
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are the ones who most effectively consider future consequences.
Here, the realist approach is professed more effectively than it is
practiced. However, the actions of the parties have reinforced the
majority's decision. Iceland and the United Kingdom have come to
an agreement which gives breathing space for negotiating a permanent settlement. Should the parties not reach that settlement by
November of 1975, the authority of the Judgment can be brought
to bear. The Court, as an extension of the United Nations and an
instrument of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, is a tool
for settling disputes. The fact that occurrences have lessened the
Court's direct influence over events is no sign that its purpose is
unachieved. The basis of the Court's jurisdiction to impose this
requirement to negotiate depends upon the nature of the dispute,
the nature of the applicable law, 57 and past fisheries treaties. 58
This broad base securely supports the majority position.
4.

QUESTIONS OF COMPENSATION

The next issue is that of Iceland's duty to pay damages for
losses it caused Applicants by enforcing the extension. Although the
United Kingdom chose to drop subparagraph (d) from its Memorial
as a negotiating concession, 59 the Federal Republic retained its basically identical subparagraph (4), 60 which was rejected in subparagraph (5) of the majority decision. 61 The dissent argued that since
of its judgment." Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),
l1974j I.C.J. 175, 202.
57. [Ijt would appear that in this particular case negotiations appear necessary
and flow from the nature of the dispute, which is confined to the same fishing grounds
and relates to issues and problems which best lend themselves to settlement by
negotiation. Again, negotiations are also indicated by the nature of the law which has
to be applied, whether it be the treaty of 1961 with its six months' notice in the
compromissory clause provided ostensibly for negotiations or whether it be reliance
on considerations of equity.
Id. at 214 (declaration of Nagendra Singh).
58. It is not here suggested that each of these (bilateral and multilateral fishing)
agreements resulted from the application of a prior duty to negotiate . Yet clearly each
was the consequence of an imperatively felt need to engage in negotiations in order
to accommodate the conflicting rights of parties.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974J I.C.J . 3, 68 (Dillard, J., concurring) .
59. [Ijn view of the conclusion of the interim agreement constituted by the
Exchange of Notes of 13 November 1973 referred to above, the Government of the
United Kingdom had decided not to pursue submission (d) of the Memorial.
Id. at 7.
60. See note 35 supra.
61. See note 34 supra.
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the issue was placed before it, the Court should have granted relief. 62
The majority found that the Federal Republic presented insufficient
evidence to substantiate a general finding for an unspecified
wrong. 63 However, the implications of this decision seem illconsidered by the majority. 64 As Judge Petrtfo points out in his
dissent, 65 the status of this claim has been left in limbo as far as both
parties are concerned. The Federal Republic has no guidelines with
which to redraft its claim, and no specific limit of time for resubmission; little chance of reconciliation can come of this situation. Here
again, the decision appears more doctrinaire than reasoned.

5.

JUDICIAL LAWMAKING

Finally we come to the dissent's charge that the Court is engaging in judicial lawmaking. Although the Court would have made a
much more explicit statement on the state of international law in
this area by deciding whether the extension was in violation of international law per se, the dissent charges that the Court's action will
unduly influence the outcome of the Conference on the Law of the
Sea. 66 The premise of that charge seems to be that since roughly half
62. If, as I believe, the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim for compensation, I consider its reasons for rejecting the 'claim wholly inadequate . . . . [T]he
Federal Republic of Germany was not asking for quantified compensation but for a
declaration of principle . . . .
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974) I.C.J. 175, 250
(Onyeama, J., dissenting).
63. The majority found that:
In order to award compensation the Court can only act with reference to a concrete
submission as to the existence and the amount of each head of damage. . . . In these
circumstances, the Court is prevented from making an all-embracing finding of liability which would cover matters as to which it has only limited information and
slender evidence.
Id. at 204-05.
Judge Gros was more consistent with the minority position as a whole, however:
It is therefore because the fourth submission of the Federal Republic fell outside the
subject matter of the com promissory clause, and therefore of the Court's jurisdiction,
that it should have been rejected in the Judgment, and not by means of an argument
based on the way in which the submission was presented.
Id. at 237. Judge Petren agrees with Judge Gros on this point, noting that: "I . . . consider
that the Federal Republic's compensation claim does not fall within the scope of the jurisdictional clause of the 1961 agreement." Id. at 243.
64. See notes 55 & 56 supra.
65. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] l.C.J.
175, 243. Instead of dismissing, the Court could have called for more information under
Article 57 of the Rules of the Court. Id. at 250 (Onyeama, J., dissenting).
66. [I]t causes me some concern also that the majority of the Court seems to
have adopted the position which is apparent in the present Judgment with the
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of the United Nations membership ascribes to limits of 12 miles or
less, the I.C.J.'s holding that 12 miles is not a binding standard in
international law implies that some wider limit, e.g., 50 or even 200
miles, is the rule. This argument ignores the fact that the Court
found that there was no rule at all, 67 but found instead confusion as
to the present state of the law. 68 At most, the majority holding that
the Icelandic extension of jurisdiction is not opposable to the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic-but not illegal per se-implies
that 50 miles is only an enforceable limit against those with no
established rights. 69 It seems reasonable to say that the question is
still undecided, and no specific limit will be standard until the
Conference reaches an agreement, perhaps in Geneva. Although
realism is not averse to judicial law-making, 70 the majority does not
play a legislative role in this decision. In such a controversial area
of the law, such caution seems well advised.
intention of pointing the way for the participants in the Conference on the Law of
the Sea now sitting in Caracas.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 37 (declaration of Ignacio-Pinto, J.).
67. Judges Dillard and de Castro reject the "no law" or vacuum theory, on the grounds
it might allow a country to assert any distance they please (much as the CEP countries have
done).
The defeatist idea that the determination of fisheries jurisdiction zones is a
question of municipal law, within the national competence of each State, must be
rejected. It is contrary to the principle of the freedom of the high seas . . . .
Id. at 96 (Separate Opinion of de Castro, J.). They choose, however, to be satisfied with a
separate opinion in this matter and to vote with the majority on the grounds that the nature
of customary international law in this area makes it unnecessary to hold the extension without foundation ipso Jure; that to hold the extension not opposable to the Applicants is
sufficient. Judge Dillard, id. at 60, distinguishes between a no-rule concept as in the Case of
the S.S. "Lotus", [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, and an exception to the norms in special
circumstances as in the (Anglo-Norwegian) Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, indicating the
latter precedent applies in this case.
68. If the dissent is arguing that confusion was the result the Court desired the Conference on the Law of the Sea to reach, then the majority might seem to have been successful,
as the Conference adjourned without agreement.
69. 'Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act,
because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the
delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law.'
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 22 quoting (Anglo-Norwegian) Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, 132.
70. "[A] possibility or even a probability of changes in law or situations in the future
could not prevent the Court from rendering Judgment today." Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175, 216 (declaration of Nagendra
Singh, J.).
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CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSIONS

Criticisms

Scholars have expressed the conviction that as the Court has
become more progressive, it has in fact retrogressed in terms of
world authority .71 Looking back to the time when the Permanent
Court of International Justice reigned as the international tribunal,
handled a relatively large number of cases, and was bound into the
world political system by a series of binding compulsory jurisdiction
agreements, 72 one can see the International Court of Justice as a
ghost, an overrated advisory committee, seldom used, even by the
organizations of its parent, the United Nations. 73 In taking judicial
notice of the disparate elements of international law, while emphasizing its uniformities, the realists have acted contrary to what the
formalists feel would best serve the interests of international law.
As Leo Gross notes in his article on the I. C .J.:
The proper role for the Court lies in promoting unification in the
interpretation and application of international law, both customary
and conventional, and contributing thereby to the rule of law and
greater integration of the international society. 74

This argument has a great deal of force if one accepts the premise
that the decline of the Court's influence is due to its having left the
paths of traditional legal formalism.
This is not to say that either formalists or realists are arguing
for the l.C.J. to influence all aspects of international affairs, but
that "generally the legal aspects of disputes should be resolved by
legal procedures (adjudication or arbitration) and the political aspects by political procedures." 75
The reality of international relations clearly shows that the
legal ways of peacefully settling international disputes are unacceptable for the solution of disputes arising out of contradictions
between blocs (Nixon's proposal to refer the Berlin question to the
71. Gross, supra note 27, at 259.
72 . Out of 130 parties to the Statute of the Court, only 46 have accepted compulsory
jurisdiction. Out of 54 members of the League of Nations, 38 accepted compulsory jurisdiction. Id. at 262.
73. Id. at 266-67.
74. Id. at 259.
75. Address by Milan Bulajic, World Peace and Peaceful Settlement of International
Disputes, WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW , THE ATHENS WORLD CONFERENCE 157, 161 (1964) ,
quoting Consensus of Lagos XV, Consensus of Rome, Il/B [hereinafter cited as WORLD
PEACE].
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International Court of Justice), or disputes arising out of the elimination of colonialism. 76

The realists are equally vehement in their assertion that the
Court has not gone far enough in its evolution. They point to legal
inflexibility as the major problem of the Court in a rapidly changing
world that responds more to political influences than to legal ones.
As one commentator has stated, "It does not help that the application of a legal rule is legally impeccable if it is politically impossible."77 Realists see their approach as the more flexible and therefore
the more conciliatory of the two, and warn that if the dictates of
realism are not followed, the Court will generally be the worse for
it:
[l]f they do not [bring the Court and the law up to date], then
there is the danger that the Court and the world will split into two
different schools of international law to the disadvantage of both
and the further collapse of the rule of law. 78

This prophesy echoes the conviction of arbitration experts that the
most accurate statement of any dispute is a compromise, due to the
tendency of both sides to over-emphasize the points most favorable
to their own case, while ignoring points favorable to the other side. 79

B.

Conclusions

The need for compromise in modern international law seems
critical. If realist jurisprudence could accomplish the difficult task
of bringing the alienated CEP countries80 back into the sphere of
international law through compromise, that alone might prove its
worth. 81 The reluctance of newly liberated nations to accept a body
of law, which they had no part in creating, is understandable. The
76. Id. at 160.
77. Gross, supra note 27, at 267.
78. Green, supra note 30.
79. Any notion or opinion which postulates extreme positions-whatever may be
the underlying purpose or motive-is incompatible and irreconcilable with the idea
of securing the recognition and adequate legal protection of all the legitimate interests involved.
Garcia, Report on Responsibility of the State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person
or Property of Aliens-Reparation of the Injury, [1961) 2 Y.B. lNT'L L. CoMM'N Add. 1, at
46, U.N. Doc. NCN. 4/Ser. A Add. 1/46 (1961).
80. Although sometimes arranged in different order elsewhere, the initials CEP are used
here to indicate Chile, Equator, Peru and all other countries that have enforced a 200 mile
coastal limit.
81. 1 8. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 15 (1961).
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present law makes few distinctions between developed and developing countries, distinctions which the newer countries feel are essential to participation in the international legal system. 82 The most
viable position undoubtedly lies between the two extremes. For example, the dissenting opinions of Judge Gros in the Icelandic Fisheries Cases are often more empirically rigorous than the opinions of
the realists. Judge Dillard, in tum, shows a good example to the
formalists, carefully reviewing and refuting their arguments in a fair
manner. However, elsewhere in the decision high polemic appears
to be the rule. 83
The tendency to characterize the actions of others in polemic
rather than objective terms is not confined to this court. Jurisprudents in general seem to indulge this tendency, often to the detriment of the Court.
A tribunal which boldly strikes out in new directions will be accused
of lack of predictability, but a tribunal which applies the law as it
finds it, and fosters "stability of law and predictability of outcome"
of international litigation may "fall soon into disuse and sterility. " 84

Or, to put it more simply, "One may either hulloo on the inevitable,
and be called a bloodthirsty progressive; or one may try to gain time
and be called a bloodthirsty reactionary. " 85 Although some blame
can be laid on others in this matter, the Court has a responsibility
to do as much as possible to aid its own image. The question of the
Court's image is a critical one to the future of international law,
with the I.C.J. as the principal judicial organ. Its self-described task
is to "ensure respect for international law." 88 It can do this not only
by its decisions but by its demeanor. 87
Jurisprudential combativeness seems to have been taken for
granted as an inevitable and necessary element of the science. But
today this attitude seems self-indulgent, and, at this stage of the
world's development, impossible to sustain. The sources of this fallacy of necessity are multiple. One is a misunderstanding of the
basic nature of the division of jurisprudence into schools. The var82.
83.
opinion
84.
85.
86.
1
87.

WORLD PEACE, supra note 75, at 163.
Especially polemical were the dissent of Judge Ignacio-Pinto and the joint separate
of Judges Forster, Bengzon, Jimenez de Arechaga, Nagendra Singh and Ruda.
Gross, supra note 27, at 254.
D. SAYERS, GAUDY NIGHT 339 (1936).
Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 1, 35.
S. RosENNE, supra note 81, at 47.
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ious jurisprudential theories should not be viewed as in opposition
simply because they are looking at different aspects of law. None
tries to explain fully what law is, but each speaks with a different
emphasis. To quote William Twining:
At the root of such misunderstandings has been the tendency to
treat all legal theories as comparables, because they fall within the
sphere of 'jurisprudence.' 88

Realism is concerned with the problems of adaptation to changed
conditions, while formalism struggles with the problems of unification of the law. The idea of form versus function is a destructive
dichotomy, as both are essential. The whole realistic reaction
against formalism in America was originally a reaction against how
the law was being taught in the United States. Langdell, the father
of American legal education and the case method, had selected one
necessary element of a successful lawyer and treated it as if it were
the only one. 89 But regardless of original motives, in the polemic that
raged in the U.S. legal establishment of the 1930's, both sides
seemed to advertise themselves as the be-all and end-all, and totally
rejected the validity of the other position. This, very possibly, is
happening in the International Court of Justice.
Another source of the fallacy of necessity is a self-indulgent
attitude on the part of many jurisprudents, who fail to discipline
themselves to objectivity:
Of all legal subjects, jurisprudence is the most susceptible to
controversy; juristic controversies are prone to be inconclusive and
unsatisfactory; of juristic controversies, that surrounding realism
had more than its share of slovenly scholarship, silly misunderstandings and jejune polemics. 90

While the reasons for this are complex, 91 it is a sad fact that "writers
88. W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 172.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id. at 80.
91. Llewellyn's view was that:
.. .(a) jurisprudes are mostly lawyers, so trained in the rhetoric of controversy, with:
(i) its selective, favorable posing of issues, and (ii) it selection, coloring, argumentative arrangement of facts, and (iii) its use of epithet and innuendo, and (iv) its typical
complete distortion of the advocate's vision, once he has taken a case, so that he
ceases to even take in any possibility which would work against him (as especially
in the prevalent 'romantic' type of advocacy) that, (b) it has proved necessary to
police their work as advocates by (i) forcing them to define issues by a careful system
of phrased pleading, served back and forth with opportunity for answer, under the
supervision of a responsible and authoritative tribunal, and (ii) limiting their argu-
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profess various jurisprudential faiths which have come into
labels, . . . labels which seem to have become rather more combative than descriptive." 92 Affecting both their self-image and their
view of others, it is this kind of labeling which often polarizes what
otherwise could be productive discussion.
It seems obvious that a new orientation is necessary. Warring
jurisprudential disciplines must be reconciled. It has already been
noted that the two disciplines of realism and formalism have grown
closer together during the past few years. Most of this rapproachment has been on the part of analytical formalism, evidenced by a
semantic and conceptual scepticism; 93 no longer is the possibility of
a consistent legal system without input from other disciplines taken
for granted. Now, it is realism that must make the gesture of reconciliation. It has always been formalism which has feared legal chaos,
perhaps overly so, while realism accepted it as a fact. 94 This realistic
attitude of cynical observation can no longer be of service; "realism
is hard work. " 95 "One of the main lessons to be drawn from the story
of the realist movement is that it is easy to ignore or to underestimate the difficulties, theoretical and practical, of sustained interdisciplinary work." 96
In terms of classical realism, the fact-scepticism of Jerome
Frank must be exchanged for the rule-scepticism of Llewellyn. 97
Fact-scepticism accepts and analyzes the personal element in judicial decision-making without presenting an outline for achieving a
true science of decision, i.e. a theory which incorporates the informents to issues so drawn, and (iii) confining the 'facts' to which they can resort to a
record, and (iv) barring guilt by association, or by imputation, or without proof of
particular offense etc., yet, (c) in Jurisprudence every man (i) states his own issue,
misstates the other man's issue, beclouds the or-any issue, evades the or-any issue,
etc., uncontrolled by procedure or by answer, or by authority (and cases where a
jurisprude has stated an issue fairly are museum-pieces), and (ii) uses his rhetoric
also without control, and (iii) is free to dream up 'facts' even by anonymous imputation, and (iv) consequently always rides his strawman down.
(d) Whereas in law one party always loses, or each must yield something, in
Jurisprudence there is thus Triumphant Victory for All. This makes for comfort, if
not for light.
W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 379-80.
92. Llewellyn, One "Realist 's" View of Natural Law for Judges, 15 NOTRE DAME LAW 3,
8 (1939) .
93. Bodenheimer, supra note 15, at 371.
94. Id. at 375.
95. W. TWINING, supra note 21, at 59.
96. Id. at 386-87.
97. J. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 14.
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mal sources of law. Frank argued that "a definition of law in terms
of rules obfuscates clear thinking about law," 98 and that "the major
cause of legal uncertainty [is] not that of rule but of fact." 99 However, fact-scepticism was more concerned with the personal interaction in a local trial court. In the rarified atmosphere of the I.C.J.,
where much of the pleading is done at some distance, the rulescepticism search for principles of decision behind the "paper rules"
of a court is a valid one. 100
Until these problems are faced, by both realism and formalism,
petty bickering will stifle the true growth of international law, especially in the world court. As Judge Gros stated in his dissenting
opinion, "[t]he real task of the Court is still to 'decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it.' " 101
lgP--oring the formalist overtones, this general statement underlines
the role of the I.C.J. in the world community-developing a unified
body of international law that is broadly acceptable. Combining
this broad acceptability with rigorous empiricism is a difficult goal
-one most worthy of achievement.
Timothy C. Mack
98. Id. at 21.
99. Id. at 24-25.
100. Id. at 14.
101. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J.
175, 238 (Gros, J., dissenting).
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